player 2 randomizes in the second stage. 
The Model

147
Two agents A and B each have an idea/technology of their own, denoted A and B respectively.
148
There is one-sided asymmetric information in that agent A has some private information regarding her 149 own payoff from adopting A. 2 We analyze a two stage game with an initial information revelation stage,
150
where agent A may or may not reveal her private information. This is followed by a version of the 
154
In case an agent adopts her own idea, she obtains a private benefit. She also obtains an additional 155 coordination benefit in case the other agent coordinates on the same idea as well. In case she switches 156 to the idea of the other agent, she obtains no private benefit, but will obtain the coordination benefit in 157 case both choose the same idea.
158
Formally, agent A's private benefit from adopting A, denoted θ, is distributed over the compact, operating B, denoted b, is however deterministic. Further, both agents obtain a coordination benefit c 162 in case they both choose the same idea.
163
The timing of the game is as follows:
Empirical investigations regarding the effect of competition on revelation offer conflicting results [20] observe that intermediary agents in agricultural markets with limited competition do not voluntarily reveal private information. Further, despite competition there is no voluntary disclosure in the market for insurance plans offered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) ([21] ).
2
We focus on the case with one-sided asymmetric information as the motivating applications are for this case. We later argue in Section 5 that the results extend qualitatively to the case with both-sided asymmetric information. The payoff matrix for the stage 2 game is given in Table 1 
182
We then define the strategies of the agents A and B in stage 2, i.e. the coordination stage:
183
-Agent A's strategy in the coordination stage is a mapping α C from A's type, as well as her 184 decision in stage 1, to a probability distribution over the action space {adopt A, switch to B},
186
-Following a history where, in stage 1, agent A revealed her type to be θ, let q R (θ) denote a 187 mixed strategy of agent B where she plays "Adopt B" with probability q R (θ).
188
-Similarly, following a history where agent A played "Not Reveal θ" in stage 1, q N R denotes a 189 mixed strategy of agent B where she plays "Adopt B" with probability q N R .
190
Off-the-equilibrium, agent B's belief puts probability 1 on agent A being of a particular type a PBEM where, in stage 2, agent B plays adopt B with probability q N R , 0 < q N R < 1.
218
Next note that the payoff to agent A in this subgame from adopting A, call it π A (Not Reveal and Adopt A), is increasing in her type θ. Thus
Similarly, π A (Not Reveal and Switch to B) = q NR c. 
227
From Lemma 2 note that q R (θ) is increasing in θ, so that agent B becomes more aggressive in 228 adopting her own idea as θ increases. This follows from the intuition of mixed strategies itself, which 229 requires the choice of q R (θ) to be such that A is indifferent between her two pure strategies.
230
4
For completeness however, we shall later briefly allow for equilibria that involve pure strategies in stage 2 and examine how this affects the non-revelation result. Further, in Section 4, we shall provide a purification argument that provides a foundation for the mixed strategic equilibrium that we examine here. 
If the inequality in (3) is strict, then we have, rearranging terms, that
Equation (4) however implies that agent A of type θ will be strictly better off by not revealing and choosing to adopt. Thus, for agent A of type θ to reveal, it is necessary that
But, given that q N R is independent of θ, equation (5) can only hold for at most one value of θ.
244
The intuition for non-revelation has to do with coordination possibilities in the second stage game.
245
As argued earlier, for an agent A with a high realization of θ, non-revelation followed by choosing to 246 adopt A is optimal. This follows as revelation would lead the other agent to follow extremely aggressive 247 strategies.
248
Whereas if θ is low, then agent A's private benefit from adopting A itself is low compared to the 249 possible coordination benefits from c. Consequently agent A is more interested in coordination itself,
250
rather than the identity of the idea on which coordination takes place. Further given that b is large 251 relative to θ, agent B will put a relatively 'large' probability on adopting B in case of information 252 revelation, even if the revealed θ turns out to be small. Therefore agent A has little to gain by revealing 253 information so as to encourage coordination on A. She would rather ensure that coordination takes place 254 on B, since while she loses because agent B's idea is selected, she more than makes up for it because the 255 probability associated with coordination on B is larger.
256
Note here that we have assumed that off-the-equilibrium path beliefs are passive. The result can
257
easily be extended to show that for all off-the-equilibrium path beliefs of player 2, and for all continuation 258 equilibria, at least one type of player 1 strictly benefits by deviating from full equilibrium. (ii) Agent B adopts her own idea, i.e. B, with probability
. Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that with probability 1 there will be no revelation in the first 276 stage.
(iii) In this PBEM a type θ agent A has an expected payoff of:
π A (θ) = θ + c−θ 2 , if θ >θ,
277
Next consider stage 2. Given Lemma 1, we know that agent A will be playing a simple cutoff strategy where she adopts A if and only if her type is larger than some cutoff value, call itθ. The value of this cutoffθ, given that agent B is playing a completely mixed strategy, must make agent B indifferent between adopting B and switching to A, so that
This
. Furthermore, given that agent B adopts B with probability q N R , the cut-off strategy of agent A in the coordination stage will be optimal if, atθ, we get the following expression for q nr :
Given thatθ = F −1 ( c−b 2c ), the result follows. is no coordination failure. As we shall find, information revelation is possible in such cases.
283
We first consider the case where the agents play a pure strategy equilibrium in stage 2, i.e. depending Firms can decide whether or not to join the patent pool for accessing privately patented information required for developing the standard through the offices of the SSO. Patents can be directly submitted to the SSO (mandatory disclosure required by some SSOs), bypassing the patent pool.
6
In fact, we can prove that the non-revelation result is unique in the class of revelation strategies, where A reveals its type over finite unions of disjoint sets of the type space. The proof is in Appendix 2. dominates the other. Hence, we cannot use the method of global games for selecting any one of the pure 294 strategy equilibria over the other. Full disclosure can also happen in case the agents play a correlated 295 equilibrium in the coordination subgame. In the Appendix, we argue that some correlated equilibria 296 with full disclosure can indeed be sustained as an equilibrium. G(b(θ) ). Let α(θ) be the probability that the A agent adopts A.
390
First consider the decision problem facing a B agent with private valuation b. Note that the expected payoff for agent B, when she switches to B, is:
whereas her expected payoff when she adopts A, is:
For the indifferent typeb, equating (8) and (9), we get:
Next consider the decision problem facing the A agent with private valuation θ. Agent A's expected payoff from adopting A:
whereas agent A's expected payoff from switching to B:
For the A agent of type θ to be indifferent between A and B, from (11) and (12) we find that:
Given that c > θ h ≥ θ, it is straightforward to check that 0 < l(θ) < 1. Therefore,b(θ) = (α − c+θ 2c )c.
391
Solving (10) and (13) simultaneously, we find that:
Preprints ( 
Similarly, equating the payoffs from A and B for the indifferent A agent, i.e. of typeθ N R , we have that
Given that c > θ h ≥θ, it follows that 0
Next, from (15) and (16), we have that
It is straightforward to check that Can one provide sufficient conditions such that α < 1? This is equivalent to showing that
< c. Clearly, one sufficient condition is that G(b) satisfies both (a)
be increasing in x, and (b)
Note that this is satisfied whenever G(b) is uniform.
9
Can one provide sufficient conditions such thatθ N R > θ l ? This is equivalent to showing that
Clearly, one sufficient condition is that G(b) satisfies both that (a)
is increasing in x, and (b) Note that forθ N R > θ l , the expected payoff for A, denoted π A (N R), is:
Whereas ifθ N R = θ l , then from (16) and (18), the expected payoff for A is:
We first considerθ N R > θ l : 
Extensions
429
In this section we argue that the non-revelation result is robust to three extensions, viz. both sided 430 asymmetric information, imprecise information disclosure and mandatory disclosure of information. whether to reveal, or not.
will reveal her type. We know from our earlier results that if both the agents reveal their types, then 449 the expected payoff for agent i in the completely mixed strategy equilibrium is θ i +c 2c .
450
Suppose that agent i decides not to reveal her type, given that j has revealed her type. Clearly,
451
the mixed strategy equilibrium in the second stage game is identical to that under the unique PBEM 452 characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. Thus the payoff of agent i is:
The difference between the expected equilibrium payoff to i from not revealing and revealing, given 454 that j reveals, is strictly positive for all values of θ as shown below:
Given that j reveals, i would therefore prefer to not reveal and adopt for θ i >θ and not reveal and 456 switch for θ <θ. Only the typeθ is indifferent.
457
Step (ii) We then argue that in case agent j does not reveal her type, all types lower thanθ are 458 indifferent between revelation and non-revelation, whereas all types higher than this cutoff strictly prefer 459 non-revelation to revelation.
460
In this case, if agent i does not reveal, the coordination cutoffθ ensures that she is indifferent between adopting and switching, so that
As F (θ) is strictly monotonic,θ exists in the interior of the type space and is unique. The expected payoff of agent i from not revealing, given that j has not revealed her type is:
where
.
461
Now consider the case where agent i reveals her information, given that j does not. From our earlier 462 analysis of one-sided asymmetric information case, the expected mixed strategy payoff for agent i is c+θ 2 .
463
Hence, we have:
Thus all types with θ ≤θ are indifferent about revealing or not revealing, if j does not reveal. All types 465 strictly greater thanθ prefer non-revelation to revelation.
466
Finally, taking steps (i) and (ii) together, the proposition follows. the case that θ ∈ Θ(θ). Note that since [θ l , θ h ] ∈ Θ, revealing no information is also an option.
483
Consider the PBEM of the baseline model described in Propositions 1 and 2. Define q *
N R
(respectively q * R (θ)) to be the probability that agent B adopts B in the second stage, given that agent A chooses not to reveal any information (respectively reveals her type θ). Recall that
, and q * 11 Such imprecise revelation may be attractive in scenarios where the technologies may possibly be copied if revealed. Note however that while we model the possibility of imprecise information revelation, it is not assumed to yield any gain in utility.
We now compare the coordination probability under the PBEM vis-a-vis that under mandatory 
511
Fixing θ, let ψ R (θ) denote the coordination probability on either one of the two technologies, either A or B, under mandatory disclosure (full revelation) followed by mixed strategies in the coordination phase. Similarly, let φ N R denote the coordination probabilities under the unique PBEM. With complete revelation, the coordination probability in the completely mixed strategy equilibrium
where p R and q R are the probabilities with which agents A and B adopt their own ideas respectively, 0 < p R , q R < 1. Whereas the coordination probability under the unique PBEM
where recall that q N R is the probability with which B adopts and A plays a simple cutoff strategy atθ. Thus, the difference in expected probability of coordination:
whereθ is the average value of θ.
512
Proposition 11. The overall expected coordination probability through mandatory information 513 disclosure is greater than or equal to that with the non-revelation equilibrium iffθ ≥θ.
514
It is interesting to note, therefore, that mandatory disclosure need not improve coordination 515 probability in the game. This follows directly from the fact that revelation makes the opponent more 516 aggressive. Recall that q R (θ) is increasing in θ, whereas q N R is independent of θ. For all types θ higher 517 thanθ, q N R is greater than q R (θ), consequently agent B is more aggressive without mandated disclosure 518 than with mandated disclosure. For all types lower thanθ, agent B is less aggressive without mandated 519 disclosure and the converse holds. , mandated disclosure and no disclosure equilibria achieve the same 524 expected probability of coordination, asθ =θ = The GSM (Group Sociale Mobile) standard in mobile technology was a key element behind the phenomenal success of mobile telephony. For example, the mobile sector in India has grown from around 10 million subscribers in 2002, to over 684 million subscribers around 2016 (www.statista.com). Similarly the e-mail owes a lot of its popularity to the successful SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol). Historically as well, evolution of standards has played an important role in many areas. To name a few, the development of the metric system, standardization of railroad gauges, the development of standardized equipment and organisms for laboratory experiments, all played prominent roles at various points of history. 14 Such conflict of interest have led to well known standard wars, e.g. Betamax versus VHS in videocassette recorders in the 1980s, QWERTY versus DVORAK in typewriting keyboards, Schick versus Gillette among razor blades, etc. 15 GSM was established in 1987 with nearly 800 of the world's mobile operators as well as more than 200 companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including handset makers, internet providers, etc. Committees are of course not universal. For example, the SMTP protocol in e-mail was a market driven one. 16 As one example among many, consider a GSM (Groupe Sociale Mobile) meeting for increasing the throughput of data over GPRS system in mobile phones. 
